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Democratic Freedom, through Democratic Constraint:  
The Consequences of Political Responsiveness 
By Jos Meester 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the past few decades a considerable literature, based on the populist notion of 
democracy, attempted to explicate the more or less successful translation of citizen demands 
into policy by the political system. Yet maximizing political responsiveness need not be the 
highest good a democracy can aspire too. Following a liberal theory of democracy this paper 
moves political responsiveness to the position of the independent variable and shows that 
there is a connection high political responsiveness (and the risks for a tyranny of the majority 
this entails) and the freedom of the people living within the state. Drawing on data from the 
OECD and the Eurobarometer a measure of political responsiveness is developed based on 
behaviour, rather than attitudinal congruence. This allows the author to show the negative 
association between responsiveness and freedom (as captured through the CIRI Human 
Rights Project) in a sample of Western and Eastern European countries between 2006 and 
2010. 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past few decades a vast literature has emerged focussing on political responsiveness, 
that is the translation of citizens’ demands into policy in different political systems. 
Attempting to account for states’ and the European Union’s non-perfect translation of 
citizens’ demands research has examined the incentives and obstacles to governmental 
responsiveness. By now it is clear that the electoral procedures, federalist state structures, 
presidential systems and several other institutions affect the accurate and timely translation of 
citizen-demands into policy (Canes-Wrone & Shott, 2004; Soroka & Wlezien, working 
paper). The general thought underlying this research program seems to be that political 
responsiveness is essential for the proper functioning of democratic institutions (Franklin & 
Wlezien, 1997). Several studies for instance take the degree of responsiveness as a proxy for 
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democracy (Brooks, 1985 & 1990; Hakhverdian, 2010; Lijphart, 1984; Hobolt & 
Klemmemsen, 2005). 
 Equating democracy with popular sovereignty, measured as politicians’ 
responsiveness to the population, is heavily reliant upon the populist theory of democracy. It 
presupposes that citizen control of policy is the highest goal of a democratic system 
(Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011: 22; Hopkin, 2004). Yet the institutions that have been found 
to limit responsiveness are often designed to do just that. The alternative conception of liberal 
democracy instead recognizes the dangers inherent in unbridled majority power (Andeweg & 
Thomassen, 2011: 22-23; Hopkin, 2004). Aspiring to high levels of responsiveness may force 
a state to suboptimal or even dangerous policy outcomes as the state’s citizens may not 
always be motivated and/or capable of providing high quality input that can serve as a basis 
for policy. It is this concern of the attempt to directly translate citizen preferences into policy, 
irrespective of liberal constitutional constraints, that is one of the driving forces behind the 
discussion on populism (Mudde, 2004: 561). To limit the dangers inherent in democratic 
decision making, liberal democratic theorists advance that properly functioning democracies 
should have limited responsiveness to their citizens’ demands (Machiavelli, 2007: 122-124). 
Institutions need to constrain, as well as facilitate, the translation of citizen demands into 
policy if the aim is to preserve the freedom of the population as a whole. 
 In other fields of research the concept of democracy is often given more depth. Rather 
than looking merely at citizens’ control of policy, a comprehensive view including democratic 
institutions and citizens’ rights is used. Frequently used standard measures of democracy such 
as those published by Freedom House give democratic rights an important role in their 
analyses. In an attempt to go beyond the populist model of democracy this paper therefore 
investigates the implications of high responsiveness from a liberal perspective. It does so by 
shifting the focus from the determinants of responsiveness to the implications of 
responsiveness for a citizen’s prospects to live a free life in the state in question. The question 
it seeks to answer is: ‘Does high political responsiveness increase or decrease the ability of 
citizens to live a free life in the state?’ First of all this requires some further discussion of the 
two democratic models linking them to the tension between responsive and responsible 
governance developed by Mair (2009). Following this, the linkage between responsiveness 
and freedom, as well as a clear definition and operationalization of these concepts, will be 
explicated. Finally the results of the responsiveness measure are discussed and related to the 
freedom within the country. 
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Translating Responsiveness into Freedom 
 
The populist and liberal models of democracy revolve around different views of 
representation. While the liberal model takes politics as a separate realm that represents the 
interests of the public from above, the populist model focuses on representation from below 
through rule by the people (Holmberg, 2011: 57; Hopkin, 2004: 636-642). The latter model 
seeks to make a strong and clear link between the exercise of state power and the wishes of 
the population, ultimately aspiring to complete popular sovereignty. Policy is thus legitimized 
as the will of the people, and therefore reliant on citizens’ equal participation in its 
formulation. Assuming everyone’s vote has been weighted equally, support from the majority 
is the only possible justification for state policy as the general will is thought to be  inherently 
good. From the same argument it also follows that any impediment to the formation or the 
implementation of the general will is illegitimate, as it would violate the principle of equal 
participation since by definition there can be no majority next to the general will (Hopkin, 
2004: 636-640). 
 The liberal conception of democracy on the other hand thrives on exactly these 
impediments to the implementation of majority opinion. Rather than relying on equal 
representation to ensure collectively good policies, this democratic theory seeks to defend the 
rights of individuals (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2011: 23; Hopkin, 2004: 641). This branch of 
thought sees state-power, rather than inequality, as the biggest threat to the citizens. It is not 
the government’s task to do as citizens please, but to allow citizens to do as they themselves 
please (in so far as they do not infringe upon one another’s ability to do so) (Held: 2006:36-
38). This branch of democratic theory thus focuses on keeping government from infringing 
upon the life and liberty of individual citizens, regardless of the government’s motivation for 
doing so. Rather than having public (or majority) opinion guiding policy, the limited 
responsiveness achieved through politicians’ rational anticipation of election results should be 
enough to keep them in check. 
 In the populist view voters actively select delegates and give them a mandate to 
implement their policies (Hopkin, 2004: 638; Mair, 2009: 11). It is this perception that 
informs the idea of party-democracy, in which parties become a liaison for the public to 
translate their will into policy. Parties are expected to cement the link between voter and 
policy, which is inherently problematic as they face a trade-off between responsive and 
responsible governance (Mair, 2009). The demands of the more liberal ideal of ‘good 
governance’ can clash with the demands made by the population. 
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 If one assumes self-interested and boundedly rational citizens, chances are that, at 
some point, they will attempt to translate this self-interest into policy. Policy is the primary 
means through which the legislature can effectuate the redistribution of resources in society. 
As the ability to formulate policy forms the basis of the state’s regulatory power, a certain 
amount of citizen influence is a given in any democratic state. Yet unbridled policy 
responsiveness poses the familiar risk of the tyranny of the majority as foreseen by for 
instance Aristotle (2005: 143-154), Tocqueville (2002: 282-286) and Madison (1787). 
Though some citizen control of policy is a necessary condition for the freedom entailed in a 
democratic state, responsiveness beyond this threshold may have a detrimental effect on the 
citizens’ freedom. After all, any kind of redistribution and most forms of regulation entail a 
loss of resources and / or freedom for some citizen in favour of others. Worse yet, these 
resources are redistributed on the basis of electoral incentives instead of allocation efficiency. 
The redistribution may thus not be efficient, and when heavily implemented may leave groups 
of citizens worse off. 
 A ‘proper’ democratic state capable of providing the liberal goal of a free life for all of 
its citizens thus needs to constrain its ability to make policy. The institutional design of the 
state is paramount in achieving this goal. Taking a cue from Madison suggests that a system 
with ample checks and balances is necessary to ensure the liberty of the population, even 
though it may render that system prone to deadlock thereby constraining its ability to be 
responsive. Whoever rules the state (even if that is the majority population as in a democratic 
state) should be so constrained that it becomes impossible to threaten the liberty of others. 
 In the republican tradition one of the primary means to constrain policymaking is by 
putting legislative power in the hands of a large number of actors. As each chases his own 
self-interest, the group will be unresponsive to particularistic demands. Only when significant 
pressures mount will their preferences align, only when a clear common good is at stake will 
they be able to make policy. The more veto players, the less policy will be produced 
(Tsebelis, 1995 & 1999). The ‘impossibility of significant departures from the status quo’ 
caused by a high number of veto players ensures political stability (Tsebelis, 2002: 13), and 
thereby the continuation of the democratic political system and the freedom it grants its 
citizens. 
 Yet participation in governance is not alien to the liberal theory of democracy either. 
For a population to be truly free it need not only be incapable of threatening one another’s 
freedom, it need also internalize the democratic nature of the system. Through participation in 
the state’s institutions citizens are socialized in the norms of their system (Ichilov, 2003; 
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Machiavelli, 2007: 104 & 149). Democratic power should find its basis with the common 
people, rather than with a ruling class, since they lack the motives and means for oppression 
(Machiavelli, 2007: 106-9). Putting the power in the hands of common people should also 
give them a clear stake and responsibility for maintaining this freedom, inspiring them to put 
in their best efforts. Socialization through participation in government allows for a vibrant and 
powerful population (Machiavelli, 2007: 112). The maintenance of democratic institutions is 
thus also a concern. Institutions that allow for high responsiveness are unlikely to be very 
durable, as the legislation that passes through them could also amend them. Rigid institutions 
are the best safe-guard of the democratic nature of the state. 
 Following the liberal view of democracy, responsiveness within a state cannot be the 
endpoint of a study. The liberal view stresses the dangers to the citizens’ freedom inherent in 
high political responsiveness, while the populist model sees high responsiveness as a 
necessary safe-guard for a population’s freedom. In this paper responsiveness will thus be 
shifted to the position of the independent variable and be linked to the citizens’ ability to live 
a free live within the state, so as to see to which of these two conceptions of democracy holds. 
 
Conceptualization & Operationalization  
 
To test the theory that less-responsive democratic states are more capable of maintaining their 
citizens’ freedom one needs a clear framework within which to compare the different states. It 
thus pays to explicate the conceptualization and measurement of the components of this study. 
The dependent variable, political freedom, will be understood as the extend to which 
individual citizens have the liberty to set and pursue their own goals (Held, 2006: 36-38). 
Political freedom is quite a difficult concept to measure, yet the abundant attention it has 
received has produced some standard measures for it. In this paper the Empowerment Rights 
Index from the Cingranelli and Richards’ (CIRI) Human Rights Project will be used. This 14-
point index is an aggregate of countries governments’ respect for it’s citizens’ rights to free 
movement, free speech, freedom of religion, political participation and worker’s rights. It is 
based on the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and 
Amnesty International’s Annual Reports (Poe et al., 2001). The project seeks to measure the 
countries’ governments’ human rights practices, not the actual conditions in the country as 
these might be influenced by non-state actors (CIRI, 2012). The measure thus fits well with 
the liberal perspective stressing the need to protect citizens’ rights from their governments. In 
contrast to other established measures such as the Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 
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2012), the Polity IV Projects’s index (Center for Systemic Peace, 2012), and the Bertelsmann-
Transformation Index (Bertelsman Stiftung, 2012) it also shows variance through the years in 
established democracies, which is necessary for the longitudinal perspective that will be taken 
in this research. 
 When it comes to responsiveness, throughout the substantive literature on the topic 
several ways of measuring it have been employed. One approach to measuring responsiveness 
is through repeated measures of the attitudinal congruence between citizens and politicians, 
regardless of the actual policy output (van der Kaap, 2006). The attitudes to be compared are 
derived from either average positions on politicized issues, or average positions on the left-
right dimension (Hakhverdian, 2010; Holmberg, 2011; Kang & Bingham Powell, 2011). 
Unfortunately, the first option suffers from a lack of availability of consistent longitudinal and 
cross-sectional data, due to changing saliency of the issues. No single issue remains salient 
long enough over a wide array of cases to come to approximate a consistent measure of 
responsiveness. In a comparable way, the second method relying on left-right dimensions fails 
as well. The content of the left-right dimension is highly context specific, making cross-
sectional and cross-temporal comparison impossible (van der Brug, 2001). Though a measure 
of responsiveness could still be calculated for a given year, it could not be compared to the 
responsiveness in other years or countries as the left-right dimension these figures are based 
may be different.  
 On top of these data problems the attitudinal measures also suffer from a 
methodological problem. Any measure based on attitude congruence is actually a measure of 
representation, rather that responsiveness, as it fails to incorporate the element of change 
essential to responsiveness (Andeweg, 2011: 39; Stimson et al., 1995: 543). Congruence does 
not equal change in the same direction. Moreover, these measures often ignore the 
behavioural aspect that the concept of responsiveness implies. Congruent attitudes (assuming 
they are sincere) may motivate politicians to try to act as their voters would have, but the real 
test comes when the policies they enact affect the voters’ daily lives. This is especially 
relevant considering the (liberal) institutions and non-state actors that influence the 
policymaking process and constrain legislators’ ability to simply translate preferences into 
policy. Simply determining citizens’ appreciation of the policy output of government is also 
an inadequate test of responsiveness however. According to van der Kaap citizens are 
unlikely to be informed enough to critically appraise policy output, thus rendering the validity 
of these measures questionable (2006). 
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 As previous measures are problematic for the design of this study, a new measure 
suited for longitudinal cross-sectional comparisons, which incorporates the impact of 
institutions on policy, is necessary. Regarding the demand component I take the commonly 
used question: ‘What do you consider to be the most important problem facing your country?’ 
present in the Eurobarometer (see for instance Bara, 2001; Burden & Sanberg, 2003; Hobolt 
& Klemmensen, 2005 & 2008; MacKuen & Coombs, 1981). The question entails a clear 
demand for governmental action to address this problem, and the standardized answer 
categories provide data on citizens’ demands on government comparable across national 
contexts. By calculating the percentage of respondents indicating each answer-category as the 
most important problem over the years allows one to compare the importance of different 
area’s, as well as register changes over time. From the question providing the citizen’s 
demands 8 of the 14 categories could be directly linked to governmental spending (see 
Appendix 1 for these categories). One of these has to be excluded however, as spending on 
unemployment benefits is in large part determined by economic fortunes, besides politicians 
decisions on policy. The 7 remaining categories covered one or both of the most important 
problems facing the country defined by 54.8 percent of European citizens in 2010. 
 As indicated by Soroka & Wlezien (2005: 670) an even clearer demand for 
governmental action could be derived from the question ‘Do you think government is 
spending too much, too little or about the right amount on [policy]?’ from the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP). The problem with this kind of demand measure is that the 
interval between measures is about 5 to 10 years, thus making it nigh impossible to determine 
what it actually was that drove the change in the citizens perceptions. Other measures from 
the ISSP, such as the one used by Soroka & Wlezien (2004), suffer from the same problem. 
Data with intervals as long as this can only be used to establish congruence, not 
responsiveness. 
 Regarding the reply of government to citizens’ demands ‘spending levels provide the 
clearest, most unambiguous indicators of governmental commitments to address various 
problems’ (Jacoby & Schneider, 2006: 548) (though it should be kept in mind that 
government can also respond in other ways, see Eulau & Karps, 1977). One way to acquire 
these spending figures is through the annual opening speeches outlining the policy goals for 
the upcoming year, such as the ‘Queen’s Speech’ in England and the ‘Prime Minister’s 
Opening Speech’ in Denmark (Hakhverdian, 2010; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005: 385-386). 
These speeches are fraught with a comparable problem as the attitudinal data above however, 
as they only state intent, not behaviour. To ensure the actual behaviour is captured, spending 
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data is drawn from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
database. To attain a single measure of government responsiveness, the demand and supply in 
each policy area will be compared through a regression analysis in which all policy areas 
serve as cases of equal importance (more information on this method can be found in the next 
section). 
 In this situation, a case can be made for a lagged measure of policy output, to capture 
government responding to citizen preferences after they become known. Theoretically 
politicians should not have to wait for an independent survey to adjust policy if they are 
indeed responding to pressures from particular groups. Some have made the argument that the 
majority of politicians are not dependent on the same poll as used in this research for their 
information on public opinion, as politicians supplement their information with other polls, 
media coverage and other antenna’s in society (Kingdon, 1984: 153; see also Stimson et al., 
1995: 545). Drafting legislations, building coalitions to get a bill through parliament and 
implementing the policy do take considerable time however. In this paper government action 
will thus be compared with one and two-year lagged measures of citizen’s demands. 
 Much the same applies to the effects of policy. Though money may have been spent, it 
still takes time for projects to be set up and for personnel to (re-)train. Some time will pass 
between the initiation of policy and its effects. Responsiveness scores will thus be compared 
against the next year’s freedom measure, as a policy’s effects are likely to be underestimated 
if one looks at those effects during the year the policy is being drafted or implementation is 
just starting. 
 On the other hand it could be argued that for policies threatening the citizens’ freedom 
the rights upon which these policies infringe have to be suspended before the actual policies 
are made. In this case the citizens’ freedom would be curtailed in the process leading up to a 
policy, rather than after implementation. This line of argumentation does not hold with the 
freedom measure used in this study however. The CIRI Human Rights Project’s coding is not 
based on human rights written into law, because governmental practices may not necessarily 
follow the law (Cingranelli & Richards, 2008: 4). Any changes in CIRI’s scores are thus due 
to governmental actions stemming from policy, not the changes in the laws that made these 
policies possible. For example: Though human rights may have to give way for anti-terrorism 
legislation, the human rights infringements that CIRI codes do not occur until the police force 
starts executing the anti-terrorism policy making use of its newfound competencies. 
 Another concern with measuring responsiveness is the potential endogeneity captured 
by the measure. While several authors have found that it is mainly public opinion causing 
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policy change, rather than the other way around (Brettschneider, 1996; Kang & Bingham 
Powell, 2011; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Stimson et al., 1995) or that citizens merely adjust their 
demands for policy when that policy is indeed produced by politicians (Franklin & Wlezien, 
1997; Soroka & Wlezien, working paper), others found that public opinion is heavily 
influenced, if not dominated, by politicians (see for instance Holmberg, 2011). It is unclear 
whether these differing findings are a product of the different national contexts or of the 
different measures, but it is clear that the bottom-up effect that is supposed to be the driving 
force of politics cannot simply be assumed. 
 Both the tyranny of the majority and the tyranny of the opinion shaping minority in 
office would lead to high responsiveness measures, but imply a qualitatively different 
processes that pose different threats to the rights of the citizen. It is thus important to be able 
to distinguish between these two processes. To guarantee that the responsiveness measure 
reflects policy based on citizens’ demands, and not the other way around, government’s 
spending on a policy area is only compared to citizens’ demands prior to government’s 
spending. As any casual effect requires the cause to precede the effect, this effectively 
eliminates the option of policy shaping public opinion. 
 Some control variables are introduced into the analysis as well. One such is GDP 
growth, as the economic fortunes of a country condition the discretion that the government 
has in changing its expenditures. Governmental parties are not completely free to allocate 
funds as they see fit, as running programs need to stay funded. In cases of GDP growth, the 
additional funds could increase a government’s ability to be responsive to citizens’ concerns, 
while a GDP decline makes any spending decision a though one. Another control needs to be 
implemented for the democratic experience of a country, as both politicians and institutions 
may cope with citizens’ demands differently in old and new democracies. Descriptive 
statistics of these variables can be found in Appendix 2. 
 Cases are drawn from all democratic European countries. Data is available from 2003 
till 2010 for the following cases: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This 
sample provides ample variation in the institutional set-up and respect for democratic rights. 
All countries in the sample are also functioning democracies. The gains in citizens’ freedom 
associated with the increased responsiveness through the transition from a non-democracy to 
a democracy are thus present in each of these countries. The variation in responsiveness in 
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these countries is occurs beyond minimum threshold necessary for a democracy to function, 
risking the tyranny of the majority. 
 
Putting a Number on Responsiveness 
 
Considering the lively debate on the meaning and measurement of responsiveness in the 
literature, the figures derived from the novel approach described above merit attention as they 
form the main input for all further analyses in this paper. The conceptual basis of the measure 
has been clarified above, but its quantification has so far escaped attention. The components 
of responsiveness (citizens’ demands and government’s spending) will here be combined into 
a single measure of responsiveness by means of a linear regression. The variance in spending 
explained through the regression (R2) forms the indicator of the share of governmental 
spending that can be accounted for by the citizens’ demands. Higher explained variance thus 
indicates a more responsive government, while a lower amount of explained variance 
indicates a less responsive government. 
 The regression analysis seeks to account for governmental spending through both a 
one-year and a two-year lagged citizens’ demand variable, as making policy takes time (and 
to avoid endogeneity problems). Using two lagged variables next to one another introduces 
the risk of auto-correlation, which is the case here (Pearson’s r = 0.237; P < 0.05; N = 98). To 
avoid overestimating responsiveness by adding up the country specific variance explained by 
both variables, the two variables are entered in the same regression. This produces some slight 
multi-colinearity (VIFs around 2.0), driving the variables’ significance up, but it allows for a 
more accurate estimate of the responsiveness. The sample is analysed in separate regression 
analyses by country and year, so as to acquire comparable measures for every nation over 
time. The six policy area’s thus become the cases in the regression on the basis of which each 
country’s responsiveness throughout each year is established. This cuts the number of 
datapoints in the regression analysis down to the six policy area’s, thus only highly systematic 
covariance between citizen’s demands produces a (close to) significant impact of the demand 
variables and associated high R2’s. Responsiveness figures of every country per year are thus 
based on separate analyses. A graphic summary of the outcomes of these analyses can be 
found in Figure 1, a comprehensive report can be found in Appendix 3. 
 Figure 1 displays the average responsiveness per country based on the R2 of a single 
regression analysis for each country per year, in which both the one and two-year lagged 
citizens’ demand variables have been entered. The spending accounted for by public demand 
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Figure 1: Countries’ average levels of responsiveness in the period from 2006 till 2010. 
Responsiveness is based on the R2’s of regression analyses of both the one and two year 
lagged citizens’ demand variables against governmental spending. The dotted line represents 
the whole sample’s average. 
 
throughout the sample ranges from 0.27 (Estonia) to 0.72 (Finland), with an overall mean of 
0.46 (the dotted line in figure 1; standard deviation equals 0.27). In the whole sample 
individual years ranging as low as 0.01 (Estonia and Italy in 2010, Ireland in 2006) and as 
high as 0.95 (Finland in 2009) can be found. The full sample consists of 98 country-year 
datapoints. Within the sample Finland and Germany attain consistently high levels of 
responsiveness, while the lower responsiveness scores are not as clearly grouped around 
several countries. Most countries show a considerable range of variation in their 
responsiveness, and almost all countries have at least one year during which their 
responsiveness score approaches zero. 
Besides a few high and low scoring countries there does not appear to be any clear 
pattern in the data. Both Eastern and Western European countries score above as well as 
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below the mean. A T-test comparing the two indicates there are no significant differences. 
Democratic tradition thus does not seem to be a very influential factor when it comes to 
politicians being responsive to their citizens. The same goes for electoral systems, 
contradicting findings by Hobolt & Klemmensen, (2005 & 2008), Kang & Bingham Powell 
(2011) and Soroka & Wlezien (2010 & working paper). The majoritarian system ends up 
somewhere in the middle of the pack, while proportional systems can be found round the 
average as well as the higher scores. Mixed member proportional systems have no clearer 
position either, as they give rise to responsiveness scores falling anywhere from the lower end 
till the higher end of the pack. 
 The populist democratic thought of citizens supplying politicians with a mandate upon 
which to act does not find strong support either. Looking at responsiveness over the years 
there seems to be no clear effect of the occurrence of elections. Figure 2 displays how 
responsiveness (chequered bar) and its component based one year lagged citizens’ demands 
(black bar) and the component based on a two year lag (white bar) change as time passes 
since the last election. The supposed mandate given at the elections would be expected to 
translate into high responsiveness to the citizens’ demands expressed one year ago during the 
year following the elections. The same goes for the period two years after the elections, 
during which high responsiveness to the demands citizens’ expressed two years ago is to be 
expected. In other words, governments would be expected to be responsive to the mandate 
given at the time of the last elections. Responsiveness does not seem to change as expected 
however. In practice, responsiveness to citizens’ demands of both one and two years ago 
increases in the first two years after the elections. During these years the one year lagged 
component even remains slightly stronger than the two year lagged component. There is no 
clear effect of government sticking to the mandate it derived at the elections. 
 In a society rife with opinion polls politicians could potentially still function as 
delegates, without sticking to a programmatic mandate derived from elections however. They 
could also follow current public opinion, and attempt to legislate in accordance to that. This 
would lead one to expect politicians to be more responsive to more recent citizens’ demands 
for policy, but this dynamic is not present in the data either. The one year lagged component 
is nigh equal to the two year lagged component (respective averages 0.27 and 0.25). 
 It could also be that politicians only attempt to function as delegates when properly 
motivated to be responsive, for instance by upcoming elections. Yet responsiveness does not 
noticeably rise as the supposedly office seeking politicians approach the elections either (data 
not shown). Lacking support for such basic populist democratic propositions it seems justified 
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to question the thought of democracy based on the expression of the general will and its 
normative goal of high political responsiveness, and look at other dynamics regarding 
responsiveness instead. 
 
Figure 2: Average responsiveness in post-election years. The horizontal axis displays the 
amount of years that have passed since the last election, the bars represent to what extend 
spending can be related to citizen demands of one year ago (black), two years ago (white), 
and the two added up (chequered). 
 
 
The Link to Freedom 
 
After having provided an overview of responsiveness throughout the sample, it is now time to 
turn one’s attention to liberal democratic theories’ claim regarding responsiveness’ impact on 
these countries. Does high political responsiveness indeed threaten the liberty of the citizens 
living within the state? Given the responsiveness data calculated above and the already 
available data on freedom, this question can now be answered by means of a simple linear 
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regression. The results of the regression analysis can be found in Table 1. The first model 
seeks to account for political freedom solely in terms of political responsiveness. It turns up a 
non-significant relation (b = -0.865; P > 0,05), accounting for a mere 2.7 percent of the 
variation. A second model that does include control variables (democratic experience and 
GDP growth) fares far better and manages to account for about 12.2 percent of the variance in 
countries’ citizens’ freedom. 
 
Table 1: A linear OLS-regression of current political responsiveness against the following 
year’s freedom (N=77, R2 = 0.122) 
 Variable Coefficient Significance 
Coefficient 
12.487 
(0.316)  
Model 1 
Political Responsiveness 
-0.865 
(0.596) 
0,151 
Coefficient 
11.918 
(0,404) 
 
Political Responsiveness 
-1.149 
(0,584) 
0.053 
Democratic Experience 
(in years) 
0.012 
(0,005) 
0.022 
Model 2 
Yearly GDP Growth 
-0.051 
(0,035) 
0.146 
 
In this second model the effect of responsiveness on the freedom within the country turns out 
to have a close to significant effect (P = 0.053). Given the modest sample size (N = 77), 
especially compared to the amount of variables in the regression, it is plausible to assume that 
there is indeed an effect of responsiveness on freedom, and quite a substantial one at that. 
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Political responsiveness has a substantial impact on freedom, and its effect is in the expected 
direction (b = -1.149). A move from a fully responsive system to an unresponsive system can 
thus account for a gain of over one point on the 14-point CIRI index. That is the equivalent of 
the effect of a democratic tradition of about a century. A graphic representation of the effect 
of political responsiveness can be found in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Country’s average political responsiveness and freedom, and the regression line 
showing the relation between the two variables (not based on average positions). 
 
As can be seen in figure 3 more responsive countries tend to rank somewhat lower on the 
freedom scale. The effect can be hard to distinguish however, given the large difference in 
democratic experience between Western and Eastern Europe and its impact on the freedom 
within a country. Still, highly responsive countries such as France and Germany fall 
somewhat lower at 11.5 and 10 respectively than the bulk of the countries (which are located 
between 12 and 13.5). Interestingly Finland, the country that consistently proved to be most 
responsive, still manages to maintain a position at the top of the freedom scale. It is also the 
oldest democracy in the sample however, potentially explaining its outlying position. Italy 
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and Slovakia appear to be outliers with their relatively low levels of political responsiveness 
as well as freedom. Though ascertaining the cause of the exceptional positions of these 
outliers is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that without these 
three cases there would be an even stronger connection between responsiveness and freedom. 
If a third variable could account for the position of Italy, Finland and Slovakia the regression 
line would have a considerably steeper downward slope. It also has to be kept in mind 
however that Figure 3 under-represents the variance present in the sample, as it only reflects 
average positions instead of yearly figures, thus forcing cases to cluster together in the 
middle. 
 Obviously, the effect of democratic experience is also significant, yet it only has a 
substantial impact because of the large age differences between the democracies in the sample 
(b = 0.012; P < 0.05). Its effect is essential to teasing out the effect of responsiveness 
however, as can be seen in the different significances and explained variance of model 1 and 
2. No matter the substantial size of the effect of responsiveness, the differences of almost a 
century in democratic experience provides enough variation to obscure the effect of political 
responsiveness. An effect thus only shows once a country’s democratic experience is added to 
the model to filter out its effect. Responsiveness appears to account quite effectively for the 
changes in freedom democratic experience fails to account for.  
 There seems to be no significant effect of annual GDP growth (b = -0.051; P > 0.05). 
GDP growth was introduced into the model as a positive growth in GDP might condition the 
room for manoeuvre the government has. High economic growth should allow for greater 
changes in expenditure for a government equally motivated and capable of being responsive, 
as it simply has more money to allocate freely. Lower measures of governmental 
responsiveness in times of economic downturn on the other hand may still reflect a 
government being maximally responsive within its spending limits. As it turns out there is no 
significant impact of GDP growth on the freedom within the country. Potentially a heavily 
responsive government sees opportunity to adept the limits to its expenditures by borrowing 
extra money to facilitate the expenses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, this paper departs from the populist democratic notion that political 
responsiveness is a goal in itself. Following a liberal perspective, responsiveness should not 
be the endpoint of research regarding democratic institutions however. The alternative, liberal 
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democratic goal of democratic institutions is to ensure a life in freedom for the citizens of the 
state, thus posing the question whether or not high responsiveness contributes to a country’s 
citizens’ freedom. Responsiveness is thereby shifted to the position of the independent 
variable, rather than the dependent. 
 As previous studies have focussed on establishing the causes, but not the 
consequences, of political responsiveness, previous measures of political responsiveness were 
unsuitable for aims of this paper. A measure of political responsiveness was developed, 
specifically incorporating the spending behaviour of a responsive government, rather than 
merely establishing changes in attitudinal congruence. After all, the actions of government, 
not the opinions nor promises of legislators, affect to the conditions within the country. 
 With this new measure of political responsiveness it can be shown that a government’s 
responsiveness is indeed related to the political freedom within the country. Liberal 
democratic theorists’ fears of a tyranny of the majority are thus not unfounded. The effect of 
political responsiveness is only distinguishable if one controls for the effects of the years a 
country has been democratic. 
 However, the study also has its limitations. It examines the relation between political 
responsiveness and political freedom from at the macro level, but does not prove a causal 
relationship. Further research on a lower lever of abstraction is necessary to establish the 
existence of such a causal link. A more detailed look at the cases of Italy, Finland and 
Slovakia might also prove to be informative. These three cases fall outside the general pattern 
by combining either high responsiveness with high freedom, or low responsiveness with low 
political freedom. These three countries, especially Finland, may prove to be very informative 
deviant cases, capable of enriching our understanding of the causal link (and its limitations) 
between political responsiveness and political freedom. 
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Appendix 1: Problem categories & Spending categories 
 
‘Most important problem facing the country’ 
answer categories (Eurobarometer) 
Corresponding category of spending data  
(in OECD-database) 
Crime Public Order & Safety 
Economic situation / 
Inflation / 
Taxation Taxation 
Unemployment Social Protection 
Terrorism / 
Defence Defence 
Housing Housing & Community Amenities 
Immigration / 
Health care Health 
Educational system Education 
Pensions / 
Environment Environmental Protection 
Energy / 
 
Appendix 2: Variables’ descriptive statistics 
 
Variable (scale range / unit) Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Freedom (CIRI) (1 - 14) 12.09 1.41 7 14 
Responsiveness (0 - 1) 0.46 0.27 0.01 0.95 
Democratic Experience (years) 60.95 30.69 15 103 
GDP Growth (percentages) 0.61 4.43 -14.26 10.49 
Appendix 3: Responsiveness figures 
Country Year 1 year lag 
2 year 
lag 
1 & 2 
year lag Country Year 
1 year 
lag 
2 year 
lag 
1 & 2 year 
lag 
2006 0,09 0,18 0,31 2006 0,27 0,31 0,33 
2007 0,69 0,01 0,78 2007 0,13 0,00 0,13 
2008 0,27 0,63 0,63 2008 0,14 0,25 0,25 
2009 0,00 0,26 0,26 2009 0,07 0,59 0,65 
Austria 
2010 0,02 0,07 0,11 
Italy 
2010 0,00 0,00 0,01 
2006 0,44 0,07 0,45 2006 0,69 0,23 0,59 
2007 0,20 0,08 0,46 2007 0,08 0,00 0,13 
2008 0,05 0,29 0,33 2008 0,14 0,37 0,39 
2009 0,18 0,04 0,31 2009 0,08 0,00 0,10 
Belgium 
2010 0,46 0,11 0,57 
Luxembourg 
2010 0,89 0,34 0,91 
2007 0,33 0,05 0,20 2006 0,02 0,02 0,03 
2008 0,05 0,37 0,62 2007 0,28 0,40 0,40 
2009 0,01 0,18 0,20 2008 0,01 0,02 0,03 
Czech 
Republic 
2010 0,00 0,12 0,38 2009 0,71 0,01 0,83 
2006 0,28 0,10 0,41 
Netherlands 
2010 0,46 0,03 0,56 
2007 0,35 0,09 0,50 2007 0,13 0,83 0,87 
2008 0,19 0,35 0,51 2008 0,22 0,07 0,22 
2009 0,48 0,03 0,48 2009 0,77 0,75 0,86 
Denmark 
2010 0,00 0,14 0,15 
Poland 
2010 0,00 0,17 0,19 
2007 0,29 0,31 0,41 2006 0,07 0,06 0,09 
2008 0,35 0,26 0,37 2007 0,51 0,70 0,83 
2009 0,12 0,21 0,30 2008 0,11 0,35 0,35 
Estonia 
2010 0,00 0,01 0,01 2009 0,30 0,55 0,57 
2006 0,59 0,48 0,69 
Portugal 
2010 0,08 0,23 0,23 
2007 0,86 0,72 0,88 2007 0,25 0,01 0,41 
2008 0,78 0,31 0,93 2008 0,00 0,03 0,03 
2009 0,00 0,95 0,95 2009 0,02 0,12 0,15 
Finland 
2010 0,03 0,12 0,14 
Slovak 
Republic 
2010 0,23 0,63 0,79 
2006 0,07 0,47 0,56 2007 0,67 0,09 0,69 
2007 0,22 0,68 0,73 2008 0,01 0,05 0,06 
2008 0,25 0,33 0,39 2009 0,13 0,08 0,27 
2009 0,24 0,00 0,87 
Slovenia 
 
2010 0,49 0,39 0,90 
France 
2010 0,72 0,20 0,72 2006 0,13 0,12 0,17 
2006 0,33 0,69 0,89 2007 0,28 0,17 0,40 
2007 0,74 0,09 0,75 2008 0,33 0,04 0,43 
2008 0,05 0,45 0,51 2009 0,22 0,61 0,81 
2009 0,61 0,59 0,89 
Spain 
2010 0,72 0,56 0,77 
Germany 
2010 0,19 0,02 0,36 2006 0,48 0,22 0,60 
2007 0,83 0,36 0,88 2007 0,02 0,00 0,06 
2008 0,06 0,29 0,32 2008 0,25 0,11 0,42 
2009 0,52 0,46 0,61 2009 0,65 0,13 0,74 
Greece 
2010 0,28 0,02 0,28 
Sweden 
2010 0,18 0,61 0,64 
2007 0,00 0,02 0,02 2006 0,25 0,23 0,72 
2008 0,61 0,71 0,75 2007 0,08 0,25 0,44 
2009 0,00 0,09 0,40 2008 0,04 0,04 0,07 
Hungary 
2010 0,34 0,24 0,40 2009 0,18 0,01 0,22 
2006 0,01 0,00 0,01 
United 
Kingdom 
2010 0,09 0,49 0,50 
2007 0,33 0,05 0,39 
2008 0,03 0,37 0,42 
2009 0,46 0,14 0,54 
Ireland 
2010 0,62 0,55 0,89 
Election years in italics. 
 
